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The question whether judges are politically biased is highly disputed. Some consider
it a heresy even to ask the question, while others believe it to be a self-evident
truism. If we look at how controversial the nomination procedures for new justices
to the U.S. Supreme Court are, we see that most participants in the U.S. political
process at least believe that justices are influenced by their political ideology.
There is some empirical evidence confirming this belief. The seminal contribution on
this issue is a study by Jeffrey Segal and Albert Cover.1 The authors construct an
ideology score for Supreme Court Justices, which is based on newspaper reports
regarding these judges prior to their election to the Court. The study finds a high
correlation between the voting behavior of the individual justices and this score. A
conservative justice tends to support conservative positions, while a liberal justice
usually casts votes that favor liberal positions. This does not mean that political
ideology is the only predictor of judicial decisions of the Supreme Court. In fact, there
is a controversial discussion to what extent other factors, such as legal norms and
legal doctrine, play a role. However, it is largely accepted and has been confirmed
by subsequent studies that political ideology plays at least a significant role in the
decision-making of the U.S. Supreme Court.
The more difficult question is whether the U.S. Supreme Court is representative of
other apex courts or whether it is rather an expression of U.S. exceptionalism. On
the one hand, it could be an indicator that legal decision-making on constitutional
matters is highly political so that judges cannot decide without being influenced by
their political conviction. On the other hand, it has to be taken into consideration that
the nomination procedure for justices to the U.S. Supreme Court is highly polarized
and the political ideology of the nominated judges is very salient. In legal systems in
which nominations are less controversial, expectations towards the judge might vary
and consequently reduce the influence of political ideology.
Testing these hypotheses is difficult – at least in Civil Law jurisdictions. From
the viewpoint of an empirical researcher, it is an advantage of the U.S. Supreme
Court that the voting behavior of each individual judge in every decision is publicly
known. This is not the case in most Civil Law jurisdictions. The German Federal
Constitutional Court, for example, publishes the number of judges who supported
the decision and potential dissenting opinions. However, it does not publish the
individual votes of each justice, except in split decisions with 4-to-4 votes. Certainly,
you can infer that a judge who writes a dissenting opinion opposed the judgment.
However, judges are not forced to publish a dissenting opinion if they disagree with
the majority. Therefore, if the court takes a 5-to-3 decision with two judges publishing
dissenting opinions, the latter two are the only ones of whom we certainly know how
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they voted. Nevertheless, without consulting the (mostly secret) trial records, we
cannot infer how the other six judges voted.
Two rather recent studies try to work around this problem by making use of the
information that is revealed by the authorship of dissenting opinions. A conference
paper authored by Susumo Shikano and Verena Mack applies a statistical item
response model to map dissenting opinions of the judges of the German Federal
Constitutional Court. This model shows that judges nominated by the Social
Democrats tend to be oriented towards one end of the political spectrum, while
judges nominated by the Christian Democrats have tendencies towards the other
end. However, this correlation is by no means perfect. Therefore, we can rather
interpret the results as an indicator for a moderate political orientation.
The second study was authored by a team of political scientists around Thomas
Gschwend and a legal academic of the University of Mannheim.2 The authors use
a network analysis based on dissenting opinions to map how close the positions of
different judges are to each other. The study mostly confirms the results of Shikano
and Mack. Gschwend and colleagues look at the decision-making of the second
senate over a specific period and observe a moderate political orientation of the
judges: In decisions, in which dissenting opinions are published, conservative judges
tend to vote with conservative judges, while liberal or left-leaning judges tend to vote
with other left-leaning judges.
Certainly, these results give us only part of the picture. Both studies focus on
decisions, in which dissenting opinions were published. Since such decisions usually
concern highly salient questions of significant political importance, one might expect
political ideology to have its strongest influence, if there is any. This effect might
therefore disappear if we also include the less controversial day-to-day cases with
whom the court predominantly deals, but which do not provoke any dissents.
However, one tendency emerges: Judicial decision-making in Germany is less
politicized than in the U.S. If even highly political cases only show a moderate
political orientation of judges, then the influence of political ideology seems to be
significantly less important than in the U.S. Supreme Court. We can only speculate
about the reasons: It might be due to the nomination procedure which is much more
consensus-oriented in Germany than in the U.S. Or it might be due to the legal
culture: In Germany, the myth of judges as norm-applying technocrats is still widely
accepted (and might thus also shape the judges’ self-understanding), while it has
been largely disenchanted by the legal-realism and critical-legal-studies movements
in the U.S. Whatever the reason, the question certainly merits further research.
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